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California Justices who have recently ordered sterilization are not evidence
enough as to the fallacy of this assumption, they might do well to note a
1963 decision of the Delaware Supreme Court which found that a penal
statute providing for whipping was not cruel and unusual punishment.'8 5
In coming years, the problems of our society will not be so much how to
get along with each other, but rather how to live with the progress science
has brought without subjecting the individual to a subservient and degrading
role. Huxley, some twelve years after writing Brave New World and seeing
its reality begin to take shape, had cause to remark:
Unless we choose to decentralize and use applied science not as the end to which
human beings are to be made the means, but as the means to producing a race
of free individuals we have only two alternatives to choose from, either a number
of national militarized totalitarianisms ... or else one supra-national totalitarianism,
called into existence by the social change resulting from rapid technological progress
in general, ...and developing under the need for efficiency and stability, into
the welfare-tyranny of Utopia.186
These alternatives to a race of free individuals are not attractive. Huxley,
realizing this, and that we are the masters of our own destiny, observed that
"[y]ou pays your money and you takes your choice." 187
Walter H. Birk
185 Cannon v. State of Delaware, 55 Del. 597, 196 A,2d 399 (1963).
186 Huxley, Foreword to HUxLEY, supra note 1, at XIV,
187 Huxley, Foreword to HUXLEY, supra note 1, at XIV.
THE PROBLEMS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION AS A METHOD
OF REFORMING LIMITED SUFFRAGE
Reduction of the minimum age for voting and elimination of the residence
requirements are two of the most frequently discussed changes to the 1870
Illinois Constitution. When considering them as revisions to constitutional
provisions establishing who shall vote, however, it is first of primary concern
to ascertain what qualities are essential to any constitutional provision which
is to insure proper administration of elections and protection of the right to
vote. These requisite qualities of a suffrage article must be seen in terms of
demands which stem from questions relating to social pragmatism as well as
political theory. Seen as a question of milieu1 and not solely political theory,
the establishment of the suffrage article in the Constitution of the State of
1 The term milieu as used in the behavioral sciences pertains to a view of environment
which incorporates sociological, political, psychological, cultural and economic factors.
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Illinois2 is the product of a body politic whose deliberations reflected condi-
tions in 1870. Accordingly, the issue determining the current need for revision
is whether conditions almost a century later are sufficiently dissimilar to
render prior considerations no longer pertinent or to merit examination of
different problems.
The basis of the political demand for a suffrage article is manifest in the
regard which is given to the right of suffrage as a fundamental article of
republican government.3 Yet during the first half of this nation's history,
congressional action in this area was limited. Until the time of the Civil War,
political theory emanating from the federal level of government played a rela-
tively small role in the establishment of actual voter qualifications. As late as
the first quarter of the twentieth century it was felt that the substantive
federal right to vote was, by virtue of Article I, section 2 of the United States
Constitution4 in conjunction with the seventeenth amendment,5 to be qualified
via state provisions. 6
Subsequent to the Civil War, however, federal political theory incorporated
pragmatic considerations to cope with the detrimental effects of prejudicial
discrimination. Essentially this federal activity took the form of two basic
demands on state sufferage articles: there shall be no denial of franchise on
the basis of sex7 or race." To enforce these requirements several federal en-
actments then became necessary.9 These requirements have a pronounced effect
2 ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 1 reads as follows: "Every person having resided in this state
one year, in the county 90 days, and in the election district 30 days next preceding any
election therein, who was an elector in this state on the first day of April, in the year of
our Lord 1848, or obtained a certificate of naturalization before any court of record in
this state prior to the first day of January, in the year of our Lord 1870, or who shall
be a male citizen of the United States, above the age of 21 years, shall be entitled to
vote at such election."
3 See Tim FEDERALIST No. 52, at 327 (Lodge ed. 1888) (Hamilton).
4 U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 2 reads as follows: "The House of Representatives shall be
composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and
the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors in the most
numerous Branch of the State Legislature."
5' U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, concerning the qualifications for voters in Senate elections,
contains language identical to art. I, § 2.
6 Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 283(1937); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347,
362 (1915).
7 U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
8 U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
9 Four federal enactments have been passed to protect the right to vote per se: Civil
Rights Act of 1957, 71 Stat. 634 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 28, 42 U.S.C.);
Civil Rights Act of 1960, 74 Stat. 86 (codified in scattered sections of 18, 20, 42 U.S.C.);
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 241 (codified in scattered sections of 5, 28, 42 U.S.C.);
Civil Rights Act of 1965, 79 Stat. 437, 42 U.S.C. 1973. Antipoll tax legislation in 1940
was not strictly a "qualification" within the meaning of U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 2 or amend.
XVII,
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on the process whereby Illinois would determine whether there is a need for
revision and what that revision might incorporate. In 1870, the fundamental
questions pertinent to the establishment of specific requirements as to who
shall vote were delegated solely to the individual states. Today, in addition
to reflecting change in the individual state's evaluation of how this pre-1870
concept of suffrage would now be best implemented, state provisions must
also be indicative of changes in perspective concerning the federal or politi-
cally theoretical evaluation of the substantive right to vote.
Assuming for the moment that a change in suffrage policy is desired and
within the permissible scope of state regulation, it is equally important to
determine the vehicle to be used. Is it a task for the state constitution or
state legislation? The question of the relative need for constitutional revision
must closely take into account the possibilities of adequate legislative mea-
sures in supplemental areas. The federal constitution provides that the legis-
lature of the state, and not the people, by adopting a constitution may pre-
scribe times, places, and manners of electing senators and representatives in
Congress. 10 Yet, it has been considered improper to have the basic definition
of the right of suffrage subject to legislative representation." This would
seem to indicate that qualifications which serve to silhouette the substantive
definition of suffrage are to be established constitutionally; whereas, proce-
dural matters are within the province of election codes. The delineation is
not so clear-cut; separating election procedure from substantive constitutional
guarantees is not simple. For example, residence requirements, which have
been subjected to frequent criticism for their shortcomings with regard to
presidential elections, 12 have been dealt with as a substantive issue accounted
for under constitutional provisions, yet they are also regulated by procedural
qualifications of registration under election codes. Accordingly, some states,
including Illinois, have rectified defects in constitutional provisions through
the establishment of procedural controls in election codes; 1'- whereas others
have reduced the stringency of the requirement per se.14
The objectives of this analysis are therefore to compare the milieu of 1870
with that of today in order to evaluate development and to determine whether
10 Shiel v. Thayer, 1 Bart El. Cas. 349 (1834). Contra Baldwin v. Trombridge, 2 Bart
El. Cas. 46 (1836).
11 Supra note 3.
12 Ogul, Residence Requirements as Barriers to Voting in Presidential Elections, 3
MIDWEST J. POL. Sci. 254 (1959).
13 During the decade of the fifties, numerous states made efforts towards suspension of
residence requirements in presidential elections. See, e.g., California, Delaware, Michigan,
Minnesota, New Hampshire or North Carolina state laws.
14 E.g., Alabama, Louisiana, New Jersey, North Carolina, Rhode Island or Tennessee
state laws. The result of a decade of activity has been over-lap, inconsistencies, and, in
general, the absence of a uniform national policy.
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changes of suffrage policy are appropriate; to characterize the desired revi-
sions as federal or state in nature; and finally to decide whether state revi-
sions would best be facilitated via state constitution or the election code. With
this task set out, it becomes appropriate to look at the setting of the 1870
Constitution in which Illinois' present suffrage article was established.
ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1869-1870
Since emphasis is placed on conditions of the time, it is proper to first con-
sider what Illinois was like in 1869. The most pervasive factor affecting Illi-
nois in the latter half of the nineteenth century was a marked period of
industrial expansion which, in conjunction with the extending of railroads,
led to rapid urban growth.' 5 By the early seventies there was a noticeable
changing aspect of school and pulpit indicative of the incorporation of new
ideas and a widening outlook on life.16 Awakening social consciousness brought
political, social, religious and racial conflict. 17 Three incidents of the period,
characteristic of the fundamental structural forces at work, were especially
pertinent to the determination of who would vote. First, indicative of chang-
ing social consciousness, the women of the state were actively demanding the
right to vote. Second, the period immediately following the Civil War posed
the explosive question of how to relate the franchise of Negroes to the suffrage
right. States stepped cautiously when issues arose involving individual state
implementation of federal guarantees. Finally, the inevitable increase in mo-
bility after a war and the simultaneous expansion of industry and employment
put Illinois in the position of rapidly becoming a center for a substantial for-
eign born population.'8
The outstanding events which shaped social structure during this period
were manifested by demographic groups, and the issues most fiercely debated
during the constitutional convention's discussion of the franchise privilege
corresponded to extension of suffrage to these groups. Accordingly, it was the
contention of the constitutional convention that four segments of the popula-
tion demanded serious consideration: native white males, foreign born white
males, women and Negroes.' 9 The debates regarding the limits to which the
franchise would be extended to these groups were bitter and heated. 20 Con-
35 BOGART AND TnomPSox, 4 CENTRNN3AL HISTORY OF ILLINOIS 1 (1920).
16 Id. at 28.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 13.
19 Id.
20 The degree to which opinion differed is indicated by the fact that the committee on
the right of suffrage was unable to agree even among itself and was forced to submit
one majority and two minority opinions. The majority report made no mention of
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troversy was encountered at the convention, placing in issue the role that was
to be given to the Negro in American society and government. 21 Even more
serious consideration was given to women's suffrage.22 Finally, the political
status of nonnaturalized males was also a source of prolonged debate. 23 The
result of these debates, a restriction of the franchise to male citizens of the
United States, is frequently taken for granted, but it did not come about
easily.
The influx of foreign born males was partially responsible for the establish-
ment of residence requirements. But of more importance, the establishment of
residence qualifications, not only in Illinois but in all states, clearly indicated
how conditions of society affected the considerations which were to be given
to a suffrage article which was to pragmatically extend and enforce the fran-
chise. Sound reasons prompted the establishment of residence requirements.
They were the product of a period when only common acquaintance among
the members of a community served to identify eligible voters and provide
familiarity with election issues.24 The argument that a voter should have roots
in the community of sufficient permanence to insure adequate familiarity with
local issues and candidates was persuasive in a period when the mass media
were relatively undeveloped. Furthermore, residence requirements reflected
the nineteenth century concepts of federalism, which in effect embodied state
dominance of the voting process regardless of whether the offices were
national or local. 25 A more realistic function of residence requirements, how-
ever, was their effect as a barrier against election fraud:
Before the enactment of registration laws, it was not unusual for armed men to
appear at the polls and demand the right to vote. After voting, they quickly rode
away, never to be seen again . . . [or] gangs of 'repeaters' were hauled from
Negroes or women; four of the six members who signed this, however, submitted two
separate reports, one restricting franchise to white males and the other proposing that
the question whether franchise should be extended to women be put before the voters of
the state. 1 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1869-1870
856 further indicates that this same committee also questioned whether limitations on the
extension of franchise should be by legislation or constitutional ratification by the
currently qualified voters of the state.
21 There was condemnation of the fifteenth amendment, and its supporters were
criticized.
22 Enemies at the convention tried to stop debate entirely. At first they relied on the
argument that mere discussion of the right of women to vote was degrading to woman-
hood; when that failed, they resorted to ridicule, charging that the women's suffrage
question was the product of unbalanced minds and that its adherents were chiefly, "long
haired men and short haired women." BOGART, supra note 15, at 22.
23 Some could not defend extending the franchise to Negroes while denying it to
foreign born whites, but the majority subscribed to a different view.
24 Goldman, Move-Lose Your Vote, 45 NAT'L MuNIc. REV. 6 (1956).
25 Schmidhauser, Residency Requirements for Voting and the Tensions of a Mobile
Society, 61 MIcE. L. REV. 823 (1963).
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precinct to precinct and voted under different names. Sometimes the same person
would vote several times at each precinct, changing coats or hats between times.
The early registration lists were often padded with bogus names of persons who
had died or moved or were checked off and voted by the corrupt precinct election
officers. 26
To defeat fraudulent practices such as these or "colonizing voters," 27 residence
requirements of some nature were a practical necessity.
With the single exception of the extension of the franchise to women, which
was accomplished by federal rather than state amendment, 28 the Illinois suf-
frage article has remained basically unchanged 29 as an extension of the right
to vote to all male citizens regardless of race, provided they have reached the
age of twenty-one and prior to the elettion day have satisfied certain minimum
residence requirements. This 1870 suffrage article can most significantly be
characterized as an enfranchisement offered as a constitutional right pertain-
ing to groups of the populace. The manner in which these groups were con-
sidered as potential voting populace and the function of residence requirements
as a deterrent to election fraud indicate that the 1870 provision was more
concerned with preservation of the political system within the ecology of the
period than promotion of individual rights and liberties. Furthermore, with
the exception of the age requirement, individual capacity is not placed as a
condition precedent to the right to vote.
ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1969-1970
Are conditions sufficiently dissimilar from those in 1870 to render the prior
considerations no longer applicable or to merit new or different approaches in
determining who shall vote? It is the opinion of the Constitutional Study
Commission for the State of Illinois that:
The Constitution of 1870 was written before the development of today's problems
26 HARRIS, REGISTRATION OF VOTERS IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (1929).
27 A procedure whereby hoodlums were rounded up, lodged for the night in various
lodging houses, registered to vote, and then taken en masse from poll to poll on the
day of election.
28 The adoption of the nineteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution had the
effect of erasing the limitation of suffrage to male citizens. 1921-22 Op. ATT'Y Grr. 47.
However, the nineteenth did not grant suffrage, but merely denied states the power to
discriminate with respect to the right to vote because of sex. Murray v. Holmes, 341
IIl. 23, 173 N.E. 145 (1930). Even prior to the adoption of the amendment, statutory
provisions existed in Illinois whereby qualified women were given the right to vote in
certain elections. Saddoris v. Walker, 305 Ill. 477, 137 N.E. 493 (1922).
29 In 1963 a proposal was introduced suggesting that suffrage be restricted to those
who sufficiently satisfied the minimum burdens of citizenship (i.e., disfranchisement of
those on public relief). This proposal did not, however, receive adequate support to be
submitted to the electorate for ratification.
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of community conservation, inter-governmental relationships, emphasis on local
government and the influence of the federal government. A convention would
want to consider what constitutional provisions are needed to meet current and
developing problems not anticipated in 1870 and which [render] provisions ...
obsolete by today's standards.30
The conclusion of this statement is founded upon three contentions: that the
emphasis on local government is disproportionately greater today; that the
influence of the federal government is distinctively different; and that current
problems regarding development of the milieu did not exist in 1870. The in-
creased concern of the federal government which gave rise to the post-Civil
War Amendments and the extension of suffrage to women has been acknowl-
edged, but the role of local government has not disproportionately increased,
and current problems to a significant extent differ only in the degree to which
conditions manifest themselves.
Illinois remains no less the sovereign over local governmental agencies, and
local affairs can hardly be said to have greater import to a citizen in the age
of jet travel than they did to the man who lived in an age when twenty miles
meant a full day's travel. Furthermore, the technology of problems allegedly
not anticipated in 1870 perhaps was not foreseen, but the substance of the
problems is not different. In 1870 industry was said to be expanding under
the pressures of technological changes which forced increased mobility on
skilled and unskilled workers. Today Illinois is faced with problems such as
the atomic energy facilities being constructed at Weston, which is expected
to create a city of greater than a million people within twenty years. In 1870,
Illinois confronted railroad growth; today Chicago with the "world's busiest
airport" already seeks a location for a third major air terminal. In 1870 the
problem was city growth; today it is megalopolis-a difference of degree, not
substance. In many situations concerning governmental structure, this quan-
titative change has become qualitative, but with regard to the voter and the
state's relationship to that role, positions are relatively unchanged.
Awakening social consciousness was said to have brought about political,
social, religious and racial conflict in 1870. Would this have created headlines
then that would be different today? A Chicago Tribune editorial declares,
"We are fallen upon a time of agitation ... there is a general shaking up of
the virtues and the vices, and the pools of society are being vigorously stirred
by the angels of reform.13 1 This could be a comment upon today's "Yippie"
generation, but in fact the editorial was printed in 1874.
Yet, there are distinctive differences between the two periods. When the
1870 constitution was drafted, no person seriously considered questioning the
30 REPORT OF THE CONSMTrUTION STUDY CommIssioN 21 (1967).
31 BOGART, supra note 15, at 35.
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establishment of twenty-one as a minimum voting age,32 but shortly after
World War I, the cry, "old enough to fight, old enough to vote!" was sounded.
This chant has pulsed in proportion to major national military conflict: 31
World War I, World War II, Korea, and it should not be unexpected follow-
ing the battles in Viet Nam. A second difference concerns the need for resi-
dence requirements. Whereas in 1870 voter identification and voting fraud
may have necessitated stringent residence requirements, the development of
personal identification methods such as finger printing and photography or
common identification systems such as driver's licenses are in wide use, making
feasible a properly developed identification system which would render
previous residence qualifications outmoded. 34
Noticeable change has also taken place in the demands upon the voter.
Election issues now reach further and with greater impact. In the past voters
have concerned themselves with domestic issues: tax reforms, community
morals, or raising children in a fit environment. Today the narrowing proximity
to once distant places finds the voter confronted with complex issues such as
Viet Nam or civil rights. Furthermore, through increases in the technology of
communications and the general awareness of the public, the foundations of
government and governing have also been exposed. The correlative widespread
prominence of election issues cuts away at the underpinnings of the argument
that a minimum period of local residence is necessary to become informed
about candidates and issues. An additional consequence may be that the promi-
nence of these complex issues will force suffrage policy, which in 1870 did not
concentrate on individual capabilities, to recognize that the ability to grasp
complex ideas is essential to an enlightened electorate, and reading without
comprehension will no longer be deemed adequate.
REDUCTION OF THE MINIMUM VOTING AGE
The issue which has received the most frequent attention in Illinois is
whether the voting age should be lowered. At almost every recent session of
the Illinois General Assembly there has been at least one proposal for a con-
stitutional amendment reducing the voting age. This is not a situation unique
to Illinois, however. A proposal of this nature has come before the legislature
of almost every state, with soundings of such sentiment dating back to the
period immediately following World War I. This is largely attributable to
the major use of conscription during that war. Since then the movement favor-
ing this proposal has gained powerful support through veterans' groups, and
3 2 Abraham, Reduce the Voting Age to 18?, 43 NAT'L MuNic. REV. 11 (1954).
8 3 Id.
34 Supra note 24.
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advocates of reducing the age qualifications to eighteen are readily found in
both Republican and Democratic camps.
There are two methods of accomplishing reduction, and both are of consti-
tutional dimension. The first alternative involves federal amendment, but be-
cause of great reluctance against federal intervention in what has traditionally
been felt to be the state's right to establish suffrage provisions, state constitu-
tions have been the most frequently sought vehicle. It should be noted, how-
ever, that although the call for reduction of the minimum voting age through
state constitutional amendment has been extensive, rarely has it received the
affirmative response of actual amendment.35
Proponents none the less continue to present three fundamental rationales
in an effort to convince legislatures that reduction is desirable. First, the par-
ticipation of younger, unregimented voters with their idealism and fresh view-
point would prevent thought from stagnating and would interject new dimen-
sions of awareness. Second, it is important that young people exercise their
training in citizenship at the earliest opportune time. The student population
of high schools is deeply conscious of government and anxious to participate
in it. The lapse of three or four years without an active voice, it is argued,
brings about either frustration or loss of interest, and the result ultimately is
a proportionate reduction of participation. The third point has been couched
in the traditional slogan: "old enough to fight, old enough to vote!" The
underlying rationale which supports this argument basically is that twenty-
one is not a magic age at which a boy suddenly develops manly character-
istics, and that if at eighteen a person is old enough to fight, then presumably
he is old enough to know why he is fighting. Accordingly, if he knows what
he is fighting for, then he should be permitted to vote.
3 6
Opponents of the movement to reduce the minimum voting age deny these
presumptions and consider the argument as an emotional and inadequate
analysis of the problem.3 7 The first point is attacked on the basis that a
35 Voters rarely have the opportunity to ratify such an amendment. One reason for
this may be the prohibition against submitting amendments to more than three articles
together with a prevalent feeling that having too many propositions on the ballot has
an adverse effect on them all. These factors have caused members of the legislature to
be reluctant to vote for submission of the amendment when there is another proposed
amendment which they consider as having a higher priority, resulting in the failure
to receive two-thirds vote in both houses necessary for submission of amendment to
the electorate by the General Assembly.
36 Twenty-one has traditionally been accepted throughout the world as the age at
which suffrage is granted. It may be noted, however, that in Australia exception is made
for men and women who are under twenty-one and in military service. Their civilian
counterparts are not given the right to vote.
3 7 One of the dangers in affirmatively answering the appeal to reduce the voting age
to eighteen is that because it is based upon an emotional appeal it is subject to
exploitation. Especially susceptible to this is this is the serviceman, traditionally found to
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young and inexperienced electorate might be susceptible to fear, impulse,
instability, inconsistency or radicalism. The opposition thus rebuts the call for
fresh and unregimented perspectives with the contention that this fresh view-
point might need a bit more seasoning. The second line of reasoning which
holds that the gap between high school and the twenty-one year old's first
election causes the loss of a participating citizenry is countered with the argu-
ment that significantly greater numbers of students are going beyond high
school to colleges where stimulation of interest is continued, and with regard
to those who do not continue, if the interest is properly instilled in high school,
it will not die during the short interim. Finally, opponents point out that the
demands of physical fitness and discipline are forms of service which are
hardly comparable to prowess in analyzing and reasoning which is necessary
for voting. Physical maturity should not be confused with emotional maturity,
and physical qualifications for military service cannot be seen ipso facto as
qualifications for voting. Representative government is fundamental to our
system; it is not an unreasonable policy then to have the wishes of the service-
men under twenty-one years of age represented at the polls by his family.
In summary, opposition takes the position that over a span of more than
seventy years, the difference between eighteen and twenty-one does not mean
much, yet it may well constitute the difference between impulse and more
closely reasoned decisions. Life is filled with the necessity of "line-drawing."
On the basis of the foregoing reasoning, the line drawn at twenty-one remains
valid.
REFORM OF THE RESIDENCE QUALIFICATION
Although the problems of industry and a mobile population were present
in 1869, the state of advancement attained during the twentieth century has
been sufficiently extensive so as to render requirements based upon conditions
a century ago no longer adequate, and residence requirements have become
the second most frequently considered change in the Illinois sufferage policy.
The reason for this is readily apparent; there are more mobile voters, and
consequently the problem of disfranchisement is more serious.
Population surveys indicate that prior to World War I only about twelve
per cent of the population was normally mobile.38 However, with the loosen-
ing of personal and family roots caused by the high rate of conscription and
movement either to service in defense plants or areas of high employment, by
1954 the "mover" ranks had increased almost fifty per cent.39 Eighteen
blame the government for the conflict he is fighting, rather than to attribute his
immediate predicament to the enemy.
38 Supra note 24, at 7.
'39 Supra note 24, at 8.
million people were mobile fifteen years ago; it was predicted that five million
of them would be disfranchised. 40 By 1960 the estimated number of disfran-
chised voters had increased to eight million.4 1
The acuteness of the need for modern residence requirements in Illinois
becomes more meaningful when demographic characteristics of the state are
compared to factors established by population surveys as significantly affect-
ing mobility. The first and second highest percentages of persons living in
states where they were not born has been found in urban (29.4%) and rural
non-farm (22.1%) settings.42 Illinois is a large urban state with highly or-
ganized and competitive industry. One result is that the volume of movement
across boundaries is substantial. The concentration of population in the greater
metropolitan Chicago area falls squarely within the designated classes of high
population mobility. This concentration of population with the proportionate
predictable rate of disfranchisement 43 should be sufficient to merit reconsidera-
tion of the adequacy of prior qualifications.
A second defect in the present residence qualifications is that limitations
placed on the scope of the suffrage article are inconsistent with the rationale
that ostensibly underlies it. A citizen is required by the constitution to reside
in a community for a period sufficient to familiarize himself with issues and
candidates before he can become a voter; but this requirement is only appli-
cable to elections provided for in that constitution. 44 Accordingly, residence
requirements of the suffrage article do not apply to purely local elections,
where the understanding of issues and candidates most crucially relies on the
duration of residence. Furthermore, because in federal elections the right to
vote is predicated upon state established qualifications, it would appear that
the most frequent use of state residence qualifications is in elections regarding
candidates and issues of national scope. The ironic result is that the citizen
who moves across town may be disfranchised in a gubernatorial election be-
cause he has not been in residence long enough to be familiar with candidates
or issues even though he may have lived all his life in Illinois, and a recent
arrival to Illinois may vote in a school district election if the community to
which he has moved has not chosen to establish its own residence require-
ments.
Because a minimum period of residence necessary for voters to familiarize
themselves with election questions has not been considered germane to presi-
40 Supra note 24, at 9.
4 1 Supra note 25, at 829.
4 2 Supra note 25, at 824.
43 Five per cent; supra note 24, at 46.
44 Scofield v. Board of Ed. of Community Consol. School Dist. No. 181, 411 InI. 11,
103 N.E.2d 640 (1952).
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dential elections, 45 residence requirements have been criticized as capricious
discrimination against interstate movers. Reform to combat this discrimina-
tion originated in Wisconsin and Connecticut. Under the Wisconsin plan,
newcomers to the state who would have retained the right to vote in a
presidential election had they remained at their prior residence would be
permitted to vote in Wisconsin for that election. 40 Connecticut, on the other
hand, permitted voters who had recently departed that state to retain their
franchise through the use of absentee ballots. The Wisconsin plan has been
received with greater popularity, and in 1963 Illinois adopted a program
consistent with this approach. 47
This 1963 Illinois enactment provides a key to rectifying defects of the
present residence provisions while at the same time preserving their function
as a fraud deterring device. The first step is to recognize legislation via the
registration process in the election code as a viable option. Second, modern
methods of technology in identification and recordation should be utilized to
create an accurate voter registration system. For example, a board of election
commissioners in the community just departed could sufficiently identify voters
and guarantee that the newcomer is not a voter in his former residence; 41 or
voter registration cards could be issued with expiration dates and provisions
for renewal. The goal here is not to establish a complete blueprint for this
procedure, but to indicate that duplicate voting can be prevented without
residence requirements. The danger is, however, that the system which would
permit abolition of residence requirements has not been developed. Illinois
legislation could establish a system whereby it would be as easy for a citizen
to vote as it now is for him to purchase gasoline by merely presenting a credit
card to a station attendant; and with an Illinois originated certification sys-
tem as a pattern for other states, reciprocal recognition systems could become
possible, establishing for voters the freedom of movement known now by state
licensed automobile drivers. All of this could be done, but it has not occurred
yet. Until it does, residence requirements are still necessary, and their abolition
is only a dangerous half-measure.
This is not a satisfying position for those who recognize the defects of dis-
franchisement caused by the present provisions, but the 1963 presidential pro-
visions do point towards a temporary solution until registration can be ade-
4 5 Supra note 12.
46 See The Milwaukee Journal, Dec. 26, 1954, part 5, at 2, col. 1, for a critical
analysis of this provision.
44T L. REV. STAT. ch. 46, § 3-1: "A person who . . . was a qualified elector in another
state or county immediately prior to his removal to this state or his present county of
residence . . . or would have been eligible to vote in such other county or state had he
remained there until such election, is entitled to vote for presidential and vice-presidential
electors in such election, but for no other office or on any proposition."
4 8 Supra note 24, at 46.
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quately developed. The same principle that is utilized in presidential elections
can be implemented on an intrastate level. Moves within intrastate govern-
mental districts can be accomodated, and significantly, this may be done
without constitutional revision until a time when abolition may safely be
performed.
LITERACY REQUIREMENTS
No analysis of the change in conditions would be complete without con-
sideration of increased demands upon the capacity of voters to comprehend.
Since 1869, limitations upon individual capacity have been raised under pro-
visions of the election code.4 9 Only when limitation based upon capacity
touches the fundamental right of suffrage as extended to groups rather than
individuals does capability as manifested by individuals become pertinent to
the constitutional delineation of franchise.50
Although the age level was not questioned in 1869, its establishment none
the less was indicative of a belief that the attainment of a designated age in
years reflects acquisition of certain experience necessary to cope with election
issues. In 1969 the increased complexity of election issues, if only through
quantitative development of milieu, may be seen to require additional skills.
As age reflects accumulated experience, the attainment of certain degrees of
formal education may indicate the acquisition of these additional skills neces-
sary to provide a comparably effective electorate. Correlatively, in the twenti-
eth century, dependence upon the printed word to communicate relatively
complex issues may advance the demand upon the electorate to sufficiently
alter the nature of the voting process to justify literacy requirements.51 The
voting process may evolve into a decision making process which cannot effec-
tively be performed by an individual without his acquiring information to sup-
plement instinct. In this context, demands expressed in terms of capacity
would be so extensive as to be fundamental to the very nature of the right
per se, and therefore germane to the fundamental delineation within the suf-
frage article.
49 The suffrage article has been construed to secure to every citizen having the requisite
qualifications the right to vote, regardless of whether he can read, write or understand
the English language. Drennan v. Williams, 298 Ill. 86, 131 N.E. 270 (1921). However,
individual physical capacity or mental capacity of the citizen adjudged non compos
mentis has been held to be outside the purview of the suffrage article. Welsch v. Shum-
way, 232 Ill. 54, 83 N.E. 549 (1908).
50 Welsch v. Shumway, supra note 49. Accordingly, an idiot may qualify under the
suffrage article of the constitution yet be barred from voting.
51 Literacy tests have been defined as any test of the ability to read, write, understand
or interpret any matter. CivrL RiGHTS AcT of 1964, 78 Stat. 241, 42 U.S.C.A. §1971
(1964).
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The validity of literacy requirements, as another instance when "line-draw-
ing" is a pragmatic necessity, is founded upon the belief that comprehension
of the written word may be efficacious in promoting good government. 52 It
must none the less be realized that the benefit of literacy tests frequently is
only superficial. They have been criticized as one of the most destructive
weapons against the basic ideals of democratic equality.5 3 In the real world
the effect of this theoretically purposeful requirement has been to implement
a sophisticated form of discrimination which has disfranchised a large portion
of the nation's population on the basis of race and not by virtue of the in-
tended purpose of the requirement. As a result, the literacy test has been
made forbidden fruit; federal enactment has suspended its use.54
CONCLUSION
The determination of who shall vote requires answers to two questions. Who
shall possess the right to suffrage? Which individuals possess the capacity to
properly exercise this privilege? It is the task of a suffrage article to answer
only the first question, and the determination of the need for revision rests
upon whether the present suffrage article adequately does this.
Despite the fact that formal education of the young is more extensive
and conscription into military service more widely used, neither of these
guarantee that awareness or good judgment will occur at an earlier age; it
may well be argued that these factors might even impede such personal de-
velopment. Furthermore, when the age limit was established it was without
controversy, and there has been no convincing explanation of why reduction
is more pressing now than it was then. Extensive debate on this has been
carried on for half a century with impressive arguments expressed on both
sides, but to date there has not been a clear and convincing argument suffi-
cient to attain the overwhelming support necessary for amendment. Illinois
should guard against opening the less difficult pathway of revision by incor-
porating reduction of the minimum voting age in a "package deal" with
constitutional revision containing provisions in other areas that Illinois does
need.
The residence requirement, though less frequently discussed officially, might
52 The New York literacy requirement, before it was suspended, was considered one of
the most successful instances of a state being able to put reasonably objective criteria
to purposeful use.
53 By 1956 nineteen states had some form of literacy requirement as a voting quali-
fication. However, in jurisdictions where there was permanent voter registration, the
effect was to secure a position of political dominance for those registered prior to the
institution of the tests. See, e.g., United States v. Ramsey, 331 F.2d 824, 837 (5th Cir.
1964).
5442 U.S.C.A. §1973(b) (1965).
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well merit greater consideration because of the extensive disfranchisement
which it brings about. Originally these requirements were well founded, but
conditions have changed sufficiently to render them outmoded. There are only
three options: retention, reduction, or abolition. As discussed, retention is only
viable as a temporary provision until effective registration eliminates the need
for a deterrent against duplicate voting. Reduction of the residence period, no
matter to what degree, would still disfranchise substantial numbers of the
population, and accordingly is only a half-measure providing partial relief.
Abolition without a substitutional provision to guard against election fraud is
premature. If either of the first two is chosen as a temporary expedient, then
the election code may be considered as a means of providing relief from the
defect of disfranchisement(i.e., intrajurisdictional movers may be declared to
have satisfied residence requirements if they would have done so had they not
moved). Additionally, the election code offers benefit as a tool to implement
governmental structuring through a written and ostensibly permanent con-
stitution; periodic legislation (via the election code) provides flexibility. A
solid plan for the elimination of the defects in residence therefore requires a
combination of the above, involving establishment of provisions in the elec-
tion code for intrajurisdictional recognition of residence55 until a time when
registration is adequately developed. At that point abolition of the residence
period will be appropriate.
The need for a literacy requirement should be recognized. Regardless
whether it is 1870 or 1970, voters are not well informed. Caprice and emotion
play a significant role in the decision making process of a voter; this has been
true and it will probably continue to be true, despite our political theory's
fundamental assumption that the voter shall evaluate and select an intelligent
preference either for representatives to government or legislative actions of
that body. A literacy test would promote a comprehending if not enlightened
electorate, which hopefully would in turn prevent the gap between political
reality and perception from widening in the future to a disproportionate de-
gree that would immobilize our electoral process. States have been forbidden
to satisfy this need, however. Literacy qualifications which set up a system
whereby one individual decides whether another citizen is literate and there-
fore may vote, are an exception to the principle that suffrage qualifications
should go towards demographic groups rather than individuals, and as such
have been seen as inherently facilitating prejudicial discrimination. Because
potential discrimination in many instances became a reality, federal enact-
ment suspended state literacy tests.
Illinois cannot controvert this, and a current constitutional convention can-
55 For example, any intrastate mover would be permitted to vote in a gubernatorial
election, or any move within a congressional district would not bar the otherwise qualified
citizen from voting for that district's congressional representative.
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not propose a literacy test. Illinois can, however, put pressure on the federal
government to continue the job. This, then, is the second alternative to con-
stitutional revision; the first was the role of the election code in resolving
defects of residence requirements, and now federal enactment is seen as a
pathway when state avenues are closed.
The opening for federal action rests upon the proposition that "every gov-
ernment ought to contain in itself the means of its own preservation." 5 Con-
gress could permit states to resume the use of literacy tests, and then working
within the presumption of nondiscriminatory state standards, Congress could
provide procedural safeguards to insure the validity of this presumption by
asserting remedies for discriminatory state actions which belie it. Congress
also has the power to pass "appropriate legislation ' 57 to enforce the fifteenth
amendment, as well as the equal protection clause,5" which has been used to
invalidate statutes which effect a "naked and arbitary power to give or with-
hold consent" 59 even though the statute is nondiscriminatory on its face.0 °
Thus, Congress might seek to eliminate, alter or equate state standards with
easily provable federal requirements when state standards are found to be
discriminatory.
In the United States suffrage has undergone metamorphosis from oligarchy,
where franchise was of only four per cent, to the yet imperfect representation
of today. Contrary to public clamor, the better reasoned argument is that the
minimum voting age of twenty-one is adequate, but eventual abolition of resi-
dence qualifications is needed, and careful establishment of a federally sanc-
tioned literacy test is advised. A constitutional convention will consider only
two issues: whether the present age of twenty-one and periods of residence
should be retained. With regard to the first issue, the answer should be affir-
mative; but concerning the second matter, residence requirements should be
maintained only until a more viable proposition can feasibly replace the pres-
ent standard. Admittedly, an affirmative response on both counts will leave
the task of revitalizing contemporary suffrage policy only partially complete,
but the possibilities of constitutional revision as a method of reform portend
questionable and even more limited relief.
Thomas R. Puklin
56 THE FFDERALIST No. 52, at 327 (Lodge ed. 1888) (Hamilton).
BT South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 304 (1966).
58 The equal protection clause was first used for policing residence requirements in
Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621 (1904).
5 9 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 366 (1886).
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